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THE AMERICAN POLITY: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERN-
MENT. By Edward J. Erler. New York: Crane Russak. 
1991. Pp. xii, 125. $19.95 (paper). 
The original intent of the Founders and the Supreme Court's 
apparent deviation from that intent, especially in its equal protec-
tion jurisprudence, forms the core of Erler's The American Polity: 
Essays on the Theory and Practice of Constitutional Government. In 
five separate essays, Erler touches upon a series of constitutional 
themes ranging from natural law, majority rule and the protection 
of property, to the separation of powers and the doctrine of individ-
ual as opposed to class rights. His point of view is best illustrated 
by the justices he most frequently cites with favor: Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor and Kennedy. 
In his first essay, Erler tries to revive the notion of natural law 
as a viable constitutional principle. According to Erler, for the 
Founders "natural law was the law of reason and thus the ground 
for the rule of law itself." Natural law meant the creation of a sys-
tem where there would be no "preordained class barriers to the de-
velopment of natural talent." 
After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which cor-
rected the Constitution's "imperfect expression of the principles 
enunciated in the Declaration of Independence," equal rights meant 
freedom for all, regardless of race, to choose their form of govern-
ment. Each individual "in the state of nature is the sole proprietor 
of his life, liberty, and happiness." Government has as its "sole le-
gitimate object the protection of the antecedent and pre-political 
(natural) rights of those who have consented to be governed." 
Equal protection "must thus be understood as the equal protection 
of equal rights," not as rights that adhere to one's class status. For 
Erler, the "insistence upon treating equal protection rights as class 
rights severs those rights from the necessary ground of equality" by 
promoting the notion that all rights are "merely assertions of power 
or privilege on the part of those who are powerful enough to make 
good on their claims." The danger inherent in severing the idea of 
equality from the notion of rights is that once all rights are deemed 
to be positive, there is no interest that cannot be disguised in terms 
of rights. For Erler, history demonstrates that "there is no guaran-
tee that class rights will remain in the service of the liberal state," 
and thus he urges a return to the basic notion that the common 
good derives from the natural rights of the individual. 
Erler's distaste for the doctrine of class rights is further devel-
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oped in his final essay, Equal Protection and Personal Rights: The 
Regime of the "Discrete and Insular Minority." Through use of the 
idea of the "discrete and insular" minority first raised in 1938 by 
Justice Stone in famous footnote four of Carolene Products, Erler 
believes the Court "has come perilously close to converting the doc-
trine of individual rights-a doctrine presupposed by the whole of 
the American legal and political tradition-into a doctrine of class 
rights." 
For Erler, Stone's use of the notion of a "discrete and insular" 
minority to apply heightened judicial scrutiny was intended for 
those "who are unreasonably disadvantaged by laws passed by legis-
latures that do not represent them. The 'discreetness' and 'insular-
ity' proceed precisely from this lack of representation." Yet, Erler 
does not believe that Stone would have qualified religious and racial 
minorities as "discrete and insular" minorities simply because they 
are unable to dominate the political process in terms of religious or 
racial interests. "These are not groups who are disenfranchised-
such as aliens-but groups that participate in, but do not control, 
the majoritarian political process." While the Court has expanded 
its definition of "discrete and insular" minorities to include the di-
mension of "historic" discrimination and "stigma," for Erler, even 
when there is a benign or legitimate purpose for a racial classifica-
tion, such legislation is unconstitutional. As the Founders knew, 
"class politics, whatever its character, was incompatible with the 
moving principles of liberal government." According to Erler, it is 
Justice O'Connor who "rightly points out" in her dissenting opin-
ion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F. C. C. (1990) that "(t]he Consti-
tution clearly prohibits allocating valuable goods such as broadcast 
licenses simply on the basis of race." 
In Erler's opinion, the Court, by using the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as an instrument of class politics, "runs the considerable risk 
either of making a majority faction more likely as the majority inev-
itably becomes more aware of its class status as a majority, or of 
transforming the liberal regime into one no longer based on major-
ity rule." To challenge majority rule, for Erler, is to attack the 
foundational principle of the "consent of the governed," and with it 
the principle of equality. 
Throughout this short book, Erler consistently supports his 
call for a more traditional approach to constitutional interpretation 
with the Framer's writings in The Federalist. What did the Framers 
actually intend? In response, Erler not only gives his view as to 
how the Constitution should be read, but also makes an effort to lay 
out the views of many "liberal constitutionalists" such as Laurence 
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Tribe, J. H. Ely, John Rawls, and Peter Westen. This provides the 
reader with an interesting 'debate,' although it is less than obvious 
that there is a clear winner. 
Rikke Dierssen-Morice * 
• Third year law student, University of Minnesota. 
